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Introduction: The two-sided matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) can be
interpreted as one where a non-empty finite set of firms need to employ a non-empty
finite set of workers. Further, each firm can employ at most one worker and each worker
can be employed by at most one firm. Each worker has preferences over the set of firms
and each firm has preferences over the set of workers. An assignment of workers to firms
is said to be stable if there does not exist a firm and a worker who prefer each other to the
ones they are associated with in the assignment. Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that
every two-sided matching problem admits at least one stable matching.
In this paper we extend the above model by including a non-empty finite set of
techniques. An assignment now comprises disjoint triplets, each triplet consisting of a
firm, a worker and a technique. A technique can be likened to a machine that the firm and
worker together use for production. Each firm has preferences over the set of ordered
pairs of workers and techniques and each worker has preferences over the set of ordered
pairs of firms and techniques. We call such models two-sided systems with techniques.
There are two kinds of issues we address in the context of this model, now that concerns
naturally extend beyond those of pair-wise stability as defined in Gale and Shapley
(1962). The first issue is about the possibility of a pair of agents being better off than in
their current assignment by perhaps using a different technique. The existence of such a
possibility allows for a pair of agents to 'envy' the technique that may have been assigned
to a different pair. It is natural to seek an assignment that excludes 'envy' and which may
therefore be called 'pair-wise envy free'. The second issue that we address in this paper,
pertains to a situation where each firm is initially endowed with a technique. In such a
situation we are interested in proving the existence of an assignment such that no
coalition can re-allocate the techniques that they have been endowed with, and
consequently be better off. A matching which satisfies this property is called stable.
Through out the paper, we assume that the preferences of the workers are lexicographic,
with firms enjoying priority over techniques. In Lahiri (2004), we show that a sufficient
condition for a stable matching to exist for a three-sided system, where the preferences of
the workers are lexicographic, is the satisfaction of a certain discrimination property. A
three-sided system as defined in Alkan (1988) arises out of a two sided system with
techniques, if each technique is owned by an agent (who we may refer to here as a
technologist) distinct from firms and workers. Further each technologist may own exactly
one technique. If a technique assumes the form of a ready-to-use machine that is owned
by the technologist, then the characteristics of the owner are no different from that of a
capitalist. Given that a technique is now owned by an agent, it is appropriate to assume
that each such agent has preferences over firm-worker pairs. Alkan (1988) provided an
example of a three-sided system that does not admit a stable matching. 
The discrimination property says: given two distinct firm-worker pairs, the technique that
is best for the firm in one pair is different from the technique that is best for the firm in
the other. However, if we assume that the preferences of the firms are also lexicographic,
with workers enjoying priority over techniques, then the discrimination property can be
relaxed to obtain the desired result. The weaker version of the discrimination property
requires that for every firm-worker pair there is a technique that is either best for the firm
or for the worker and for no two distinct pair is such a technique identical. Such
problems, which we call entirely lexicographic are the ones studied by Danilov (2003) in
the context of three-sided systems. While Danilov (2003) proves the existence of a stable2
matching for an entirely lexicographic three-sided system, a pair-wise envy free matching
may fail to exist in an entirely lexicographic two-sided system with techniques. The
entire analysis concerning pair-wise envy free matchings makes essential use of the
deferred acceptance procedure due to Gale and Shapley (1962).
Our subsequent result shows that a stable matching always exists for an entirely
lexicographic two-sided system with techniques where each firm is initially endowed
with a technique. The proof of this result uses both the Gale and Shapley (1962) theorem,
as well as the theorem due Shapley and Scarf (1972) concerning the existence of a core
allocation in a market where indivisible objects are traded. The proof of the relevant
theorem in Shapley and Scarf (1972), uses Gale's Top Trading Cycle Algorithm.
The preference of a firm is separable if its preference over workers is independent of the
technique and its preference over techniques is independent of the worker. The
preference of a worker is separable if its preference over firms is independent of the
technique and its preference over techniques is independent of the firm. A two-sided
system with techniques is said to be separable if preferences of all firms and workers are
separable. Replicating some of the proofs used earlier, we can show that if a two-sided
system with techniques is separable, then the results that were established for entirely
lexicographic two-sided systems with techniques, continue to remain valid. 
Following the tradition of Gale and Shapley (1962), we model our analysis in terms of a
firm employing at most one worker. By present day reckoning, a firm employing at most
one worker, is usually a small road-side shop, rather than an industrial unit. Hence, it
might appear as if our analysis has little if no relevance to more common real world
situations. However, Roth and Sotomayor (1988) contains an elaborate discussion of
matching models, where firms may employ more that one worker. It turns out in their
analysis, that the cooperative theory for such firms is almost identical to the cooperative
theory arising out of the Gale and Shapley (1962) framework. This occurs, since each
firm can be replicated as often as the number of workers it can employ, with each replica
having the same preferences over workers as the original firm. Further, the preferences of
the workers between replicas of two different firms, should be exactly the same as her
preferences between the originals. However, the non-cooperative theory in the context of
each firm employing more than one worker, is considerably different from the non-
cooperative theory where firms can employ at most one.
Since our paper, is concerned with the cooperative theory of two-sided systems with
techniques, the model that we use of a firm employing at most one worker, continues to
provide valuable insights concerning the existence of stable matchings in labor markets. 
The Model: We define a two-sided system with techniques in the following manner. Let
W be a no-empty finite set denoting the set of workers, F a non-empty finite set denoting
the set of firms and T a non-empty finite set denoting the set of techniques. We assume
that the cardinality of T (i.e. the number of available techniques), does not exceed either
the number of workers or the number of firms. 
Each w∈W has preference over (F×T)∪{w} defined by a weak order (: reflexive,
complete, transitive binary relation) ≥w whose asymmetric part is denoted >w. Each f∈F
has preference over (W×T)∪{f} defined by a linear order (: anti-symmetric weak order)
≥f whose asymmetric part is denoted >f.3
Given w∈W and f∈F, let A(w) = {(w,f,t)∈{w}×F×T/ (f,t) >w w} and A(f) = {(w,f,
t)∈W×{f}×T/ (w,t) >f f}. A(w) is called the acceptable set of w and A(f) is called the
acceptable set of f.
Let W* = {w ∈W/ A(w) ≠ φ} and F* = {f ∈F/ A(f) ≠ φ}. 
For the sake of expositional simplicity, we assume the following: 
(i) W* = W, F* = F;
(ii) For all f∈F and w∈W: A(f) = {f}×W×T and A(w) = F×{w}×T. 
Any non-empty subset S of F∪W is called a coalition.
A one-one function η: F∪ W → (W×F×T)∪(W∪F), satisfying:
(i) for all a∈ W∪F: η(a)∈ A(a)∪{a};
(ii)for all w∈W, f∈F and t∈T the following are equivalent: (a) η(w) = (w,f,t); (b) η(f) =
(w,f,t);
is called a matching.
Given a matching η, w∈W, f∈F and t∈T, let 
η
W(w) = w if η(w) = w,
            = (f,t) if η(w) = (w, f, t);
η
F(f) = f if η(f) = f.
            = (w,t) if η(f) = (w, f, t).
Given a matching η and a coalition S, let T(η,S) = {t∈T/ η(w) = (w,f,t) for some
w∈W∩S and f∈F∩S}. 
Given a matching µ a pair (w,f)∈W×F is said to envy a pair (w',f')∈W×F if (f,t) >w
µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f) where µ
W(w') = (f',t) ∈F×T. 
A matching µ is said to be pair-wise envy-free if there does not exist w∈W, f∈F and t∈T
such that: (f,t) >w µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f). 
Note that in the definition of a pair-wise envy free matching if µ
W(w') = (f',t) for
some (w',f')∈W×F, then (f,t) >w µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f) implies that (w,f) envies
(w',f'). However, if there does not exist (w',f')∈W×F such that µ
W(w') = (f',t), then
although (f,t) >w µ
W(w) and (w,t) >f µ
F(f), it is not the case that (w,f)  envies a pair in
W×F.




Thus a matching µ is pair-wise envy free if and only if it is not blocked by any triplet in
W×F×T.
Let τ: F→T be a one-one function. For f∈F, τ(f) denotes the technique that f has been
initially endowed with.4
A two-sided system with techniques along with a one-one function τ from F to T is called
a private ownership two-sided system with techniques. 
A matching µ for such a system is said to be blocked by a coalition S if there exists a
matching η on S such that (i) µ
W(W∩S) = (F∩S)×T(µ,S), η
W(W∩S) = (F∩S)×τ(F∩S);
µ
F(F∩S) = (W∩S)×T(µ,S), η






Note: The requirements for a matching to be blocked by a coalition are considerably
different from the requirements for a matching to be blocked by a triplet, as defined
earlier. First a blocking coalition must comprise of firms and workers, while a blocking
triplet comprises of a firm, a worker and a technique. Second a blocking coalition is in
the context of an initial endowment of techniques where as no initial endowment is
involved in the case of a blocking triplet.
 
A matching µ is said to be stable if it is not blocked by any coalition.
A two-sided system with techniques is said to be lexicographic for workers if for all
w∈W there exists a linear order Pw on F such that for all f,f'∈F with f ≠ f' and t,t'∈T:
fPwf' implies (f,t) >w (f',t').
A two-sided system with techniques is said to be lexicographic for firms if for all f∈F
there exists a linear order Pf on W such that for all w,w'∈W with w ≠ w' and t,t'∈T: wPfw'
implies (w,t) >f (w',t').
A two-sided system with techniques is said to be entirely lexicographic if it is both
lexicographic for workers as well as for firms.
Existence of pair-wise envy free matchings: 
Consider an entirely lexicographic two-sided system with techniques where each of
W,F,T has at least two elements and there exists t*∈T such that for all w∈W,f∈F and
t∈T\{t*}: (f,t*) >w (f,t) and (w,t*) >f (w,t). Clearly there does not exist any pair-wise
envy free matching. However, as we will observe in a subsequent section, every entirely
lexicographic private ownership two-sided system with techniques, admits a stable
matching.
However, if we invoke the following Weak Discrimination Property (WDP) for an
entirely lexicographic two-sided system with techniques, then we can prove the existence
of a pair-wise envy free matching. 
A two-sided system with techniques is said to satisfy Weak Discrimination Property
(WDP) if there exists a function β:F× W→T such that (a) for all w,w1∈W and f,f1
∈F with w≠w1 and f≠f1:β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1); (b) for all w∈W and f∈F: either [(w,β(f,w)) ≥f
(w,t) for all t∈T] or [(f,β(f,w)) ≥w (f,t) for all t∈T].
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the requirements of WDP.
Lemma 1: Suppose a two sided system with techniques satisfies WDP. Then,
there exists a function β:F× W→T such that for all w,w1∈W and f,f15
∈F with w≠w1 and f≠f1: (a) β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1);  (b) either[(w,β(f,w)) ≥f (w, β(f1,w1))] or
[(f,β(f,w)) ≥w (f, β(f1,w1))]. 
Proposition 1: A necessary and sufficient condition for pair-wise envy free matching to
exist for an entirely lexicographic two-sided system with techniques is the following
condition:  
There exists a function β:F× W→T such that for all w,w1∈W and f,f1
∈F with w≠w1 and f≠f1:
(a) β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1); 
(b) either[(w,β(f,w)) ≥f (w, β(f1,w1))] or [(f,β(f,w)) ≥w (f, β(f1,w1))].
Proof: The necessity part of the proposition being easy to establish, let us establish
sufficiency.
As in Gale and Shapley (1962), we obtain a ρ: W∪F→ W∪F such that:
(i) for all w∈W, f∈F:ρ(w)∈F∪{w}, ρ(f)∈W∪{f}; 
(ii) for all a∈ W∪F: ρ(ρ(a)) = a;
(iii)there does not exist w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPf ρ(f) and fPwρ(w).
Since W*=W, F* = F under our assumption on preferences it must be the case that either
ρ(w)∈F for all w∈W, or ρ(f)∈W for all f∈F.
The matching µ is defined as follows:
If  w∈W and f∈F are such that ρ(w) = f∈F, then let µ(w) = µ(f) = (w,f,β(f,w)). For any
other 'a' belonging to W∪F, let µ(a) = a.
Since cardinality of T does not exceed the cardinality of either W or F, and since either
ρ(w)∈F for all w∈W, or ρ(f)∈W for all f∈F, it must be the case that for all t∈T, there
exists w∈W such that t = β(µ(w),w).
It is easily verified that µ is pair-wise envy free. Q.E.D. 
The following theorem now follows as an immediate consequence of Lemma 1 and
Proposition 1.
Theorem 1: Suppose an entirely lexicographic two-sided system with techniques satisfies
WDP. Then there exists a pair-wise envy-free matching.
It is worth noting that WDP is not a necessary condition for the existence of pair-wise
envy free matching as the following example reveals.
Example 1: Let W = {w1,w2,w3}, F= {f1,f2,f3} and T = {t1,t2,t3}. Suppose that for each
w∈W there exists a linear order Pw on F satisfying f1Pwf2Pwf3 and for each f∈F there
exists a linear order Pf on W satisfying w1Pfw2Pfw3. Suppose for each w∈W there exists a
linear order Qw on T and for each f∈F there exists a linear order Qf on T. Suppose t1Qa t2
Qa t3  for a ∈{f1, w1,w2} and t3Qa t2 Qa t1 for a ∈{w3, f2,f3}. Further suppose that for all
w,w1∈W, f,f1 ∈F and t,t1∈T with w≠w1, f≠f1 and t≠t1: (a) (w,t) >f (w1,t1) if and only if
wPfw1; (b) (w,t) >f (w,t1) if and only if tQft1; (c) (f,t) >w (f1,t1) if and only if fPwf1; (d) (f,t)
>w (f,t1) if and only if tQwt1.
Towards a contradiction suppose that this two-sided system with techniques satisfies6
WDP. Then there exists a function β:F× W→T such that (a) for all w,w'∈W and f,f'
∈F with w≠w' and f≠f':β(f,w) ≠ β(f',w'); (b) for all w∈W and f∈F: either [(w,β(f,w)) ≥f
(w,t) for all t∈T] or [(f,β(f,w)) ≥w (f,t) for all t∈T].
Thus, β(f1,w1) = t1 and β(f3,w3) = t3. Since β(f2,w2) ∈ {t1,t3}, the requirements of WDP
are violated. Thus this system does not satisfy WDP. 
However, the matching with the associated triplets being (wi,fi,ti) for i = 1,2,3 is indeed
pair-wise envy free. Further, the system does satisfy the requirement of Proposition 1,
with β(f1,w1) = t1, β(f3,w3) = t3 and β(f2,w2) = t2.
In view of the above example, WDP does not qualify as a tight requirement for the
existence of a pair-wise envy free matching. Since Proposition 1, provides a necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of stable matching, the requirements of the
Proposition and WDP are easily comparable. The advantage of WDP apart from its
elegance lies in its easy comprehensibility. Whereas the requirement of Proposition 1, is
akin to a repetition of the definition of a pair-wise envy free matching, WDP is a
statement that is independent of the latter. That is precisely what makes WDP more
attractive than the requirement of Proposition 1. 
Stable Matchings: 
Theorem 2: Every entirely lexicographic private ownership two-sided system with
techniques has at least one stable matching.
Proof: As in Gale and Shapley (1962), we obtain a ρ: W∪F→ W∪F such that:
(i) for all w∈W, f∈F:ρ(w)∈F∪{w}, ρ(f)∈W∪{f}; 
(ii) for all a∈ W∪F: ρ(ρ(a)) = a;
(iii)there does not exist w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPf ρ(f) and fPwρ(w).
Case 1: #W ≤ # F: If {w∈W/ρ(w) = w} ≠ φ then {f∈F/ρ(f) = f} ≠ φ. Thus, if {w∈W/ρ(w)
= w} ≠ φ, then there exists w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPf ρ(f) and
fPwρ(w), leading to a contradiction. Hence {w∈W/ρ(w) = w} = φ. Thus, 
{f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W}≠φ. 
Case 2: #W > # F: If {f∈F/ρ(f) = f} ≠ φ then {w∈W/ρ(w) = w} ≠ φ. Thus, if {f∈F/ρ(f) =
f} ≠ φ, then there exists w∈W and f∈F such that w ≠ρ(f), f≠ρ(w), wPf ρ(f) and fPwρ(w),
leading to a contradiction. Hence suppose {f∈F/ρ(f) = f} = φ. Thus, {f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W}≠φ.
For f∈F, such that ρ(f) ∈W, let Rf be the linear order on T such that for all t,t'∈T: tRft' if
and only if (ρ(f),t) >f (ρ(f),t').
Applying Gale's Top Trading Cycle Algorithm as in Shapley and Scarf (1972), there
exists a one-one function x:{ f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W} → T satisfying the following property:
Given any non-empty subset F
0 of { f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W} and a one-one function y: F
0 →
{τ(f)/f∈F
0}, {y(f) >f x(f) for some f∈F
0] implies [x(f') >f' y(f') for some f'∈F
0 \{f}].
The matching µ is defined as follows:
If w∈W and f∈F are such that ρ(w) = f∈F, then let µ(w) = µ(f) = (w,f,x(f)). For any other
'a' belonging to W∪F, let µ(a) = a.7
Towards a contradiction suppose there exists a matching η on S such that (i) µ
W(W∩S) =
(F∩S)×T(µ,S), η
W(W∩S) = (F∩S)×τ(F∩S); µ
F(F∩S) = (W∩S)×T(µ,S), η
F(F∩S) =





Let f∈F∩S and w∈W∩S be such that η(w) = (w,f,t) = η(f). Thus,  η
F(f) = (w,t) >f µ
F(f) =
(ρ(f), x(f)) and η
W(w) = (f,t) >w µ
W(w) = (ρ(w), x(ρ(w))). If ρ(f) ≠w, then wPfρ(f) and
fPwρ(w) leading to a contradiction. Thus, ρ(f) = w and ρ(w) = f. Thus, given f∈F∩S
there exists y(f)∈ τ(F∩S) such that: η
F(f) = (ρ(f), y(f)), where (ρ(f), y(f)) >f  (ρ(f), x(f)).
Since f,f'∈F∩S with f ≠ f' implies y(f) ≠ y(f'), we are again lead to a contradiction. Thus
µ is stable. Q.E.D.
Note: A characteristic feature of the Top-Trading Cycle Algorithm used to establish the
theorem due to Shapley and Scarf (1972) that we invoke, is the following: there exists a
partition {F1,…,Fk} of { f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W} such that (i) x(Fj) = τ(Fj) for j = 1,…,k; (ii) if  
y:{ f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W}→T is any function with y(f) >f x(f) for some f ∈Fi and i∈{1,..,k}, then
there exists j ∈{1,..,k} with j < i, and f'∈Fj such that y(f) = x(f'). 
It follows as a direct consequence of this observation that there does not exist any non-
empty subset F
0 of { f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W} and a function y: {f∈F/ρ(f) ∈W}→T with y(F
0) =
x(F
0) such that y(f) >f x(f) for all f∈F
0. For if there did exist such a y, then letting i = min
{j/ Fj ∩F
0 ≠ φ}, we require that for f∈Fi, y(f) ∈x(Fj), for some j < i. This would contradict




Separable Preferences: A two-sided system with techniques is said to be separable for
workers if for all w∈W  there exists linear orders Pw on F and Qw on T such that for all
(f,t), (f',t') ∈F×T: (f,t) ≥w (f',t) if and only if fPwf' and (f,t) ≥w (f,t') if and only if tQwt' 
A two-sided system with techniques is said to be separable for firms if for all f∈F there
exists linear orders Pf on W and Qf on T such that for all (w,t), (w',t') ∈W×T: (w,t) ≥f
(w',t) if and only if  wPfw' and (w,t) ≥f (w,t') if and only if tQft'.
A two-sided system with techniques is said to be separable if it is separable for both firms
and workers.
If a two-sided system with techniques is separable then WDP reduces to the following:
There exists a function β:F× W→T such that (a) for all w,w1∈W and f,f1
∈F with w≠w1 and f≠f1:β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1); (b) for all w∈W and f∈F: either [β(f,w))Qf t
for all t∈T] or [β(f,w)) Qw t for all t∈T].
If a two-sided system with techniques is separable, then the equivalent versions of
Proposition 1, Theorems 1 and 2 continue to be valid.
Proposition 2: A necessary and sufficient condition for pair-wise envy free matching to
exist for a separable two-sided system with techniques is the following condition:  
There exists a function β:F× W→T such that for all w,w1∈W and f,f1
∈F with w≠w1 and f≠f1: (a) β(f,w) ≠ β(f1,w1);  (b) either[(w,β(f,w)) ≥f (w, β(f1,w1))] or
[(f,β(f,w)) ≥w (f, β(f1,w1))].8
Theorem 3: Suppose a separable two-sided system with techniques satisfies WDP. Then
there exists a pair-wise envy-free matching.
  
Theorem 4: Every separable private ownership two-sided system with techniques has at
least one stable matching.
The proofs are identical to the ones provided for Proposition 1, Theorems 1 and 2
respectively.
In Example 1, the preferences are separable. Hence, a two-sided system with techniques
that is separable may admit a pair-wise envy free matching without satisfying WDP.
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Appendix
Deferred Acceptance Procedure With Firms Proposing (due to Gale and Shapley
(1962): To start each firm makes an offer to her favorite worker, i.e. to the worker ranked
first according to her preferences. Each worker who receives one or more offers, rejects
all but his most preferred of these. Any firm whose offer is not rejected at this point is
kept “pending”.
At any step any firm whose offer was rejected at the previous step, makes an offer to her
next choice (i.e., to her most preferred worker, among those who have not rejected her
offer), so long as there remains a worker to whom she has not yet made an offer. If at any
step of the procedure, a firm has already made offers to, and been rejected by all workers,
then she makes no further offers. Each worker receiving offers rejects all but his most9
preferred among the group consisting of the new offers together with any firm that he
may have kept pending from the previous step.
The algorithm stops after any step in which no firm is rejected. At this point, every firm
is either kept pending by some worker or has been rejected by every worker. The
matching ρ that is defined now, associates to each firm the worker who has kept her
pending, if there be any. Further, workers who did not receive any offers at all, and firms
who have been rejected by all the workers, remain single.